Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms
Michael Wagner (Wagner) was employed by Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC (Kona) as a diver. On December 16, 2009 Wagner filed maritime personal injury claims against Kona seeking recovery for repeated, severe, and permanently disabling barotrauma to his ears resulting in severe vertigo, binaural hearing loss and tinnitus. Wagner's complaint seeks to recover damages under the general maritime law claim for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and vessel owner negligence. In addition to these claims Wagner also filed a Jones Act claim against his employer.
Additionally, Wagner seeks to recover punitive damages under the Jones Act and the general maritime law claims of unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and vessel owner negligence. Wagner later amended his complaint removing the punitive damages claim in regards to his maintenance and cure claim. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages in relation to Wagner's Jones Act claim.Does the Jones Act recognize the availability of Punitive Damages?
The Court began its analysis with a historic
overview of the early legal framework of Jones Act cases prior to the Townsend
decision that have routinely interpreted the Act as precluding the recovery of
punitive damages. Specifically, these
cases note that the Jones Act incorporates the standards of the Federal
Employers Liability Act (FELA) that state that punitive damages are
non-pecuniary and therefore barred by the language of the Jones Act.
The Court then examined the Supreme Court's decisions in Miles v. Apex Marine, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, and Townsend v. Atlantic Sounding. In Miles, the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act limited a seaman's recovery to pecuniary damages and therefore a seaman could not recover punitive damages under the Act. While in Baker, the Supreme Court recognized punitive damages for plaintiffs that suffered economic loss as a result of the 1989 Exxon oil spill under federal maritime common law. The Court differentiated the cases in Miles and Baker because in Miles Congress had provided guidance through legislation while no such legislation existed for the situation in Baker. Baker then opened the door for the Supreme Court's decision in Townsend which held that seamen can recover punitive damages under the general maritime law maintenance and cure claim.
The district court concluded that in order to resolve the issue of whether punitive damages now exist under the Jones Act requires the court to determine whether the Supreme Court's decision in Townsend overturns longstanding precedent that the Jones Act precludes punitive damages. In its reading of Townsend, the District Court did not find Townsend to be irreconcilable with long standing precedent barring punitive damage recovery under the Jones Act because Townsend did not specifically address the Jones Act.
Therefore the District Court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that Townsend permitted the recovery of punitive damages
in all maritime actions and that nothing in the Jones Act expressly rejects the
availability of punitive damages. The
District Court held that the Townsend Court only recognized punitive damages
for maintenance and cure claims because it pre-dated the Jones Act and that the remedy remained
unaltered after the passing of the Jones Act legislation. Therefore, the court found no basis to overturn the longstanding precedent denying punitive damages under the Jones Act.
Finally, the court addressed Wagner's final argument that punitive damages are pecuniary damages instead of non-pecuniary damages. Specifically, Wagner argued that because punitive damages could be estimated and monetarily compensated they fit the definition of pecuniary damages not non-pecuniary damages. The district court rejected this argument citing binding precedent that explicitly held that punitive damages are non-pecuniary damages.
Thus, the court granted Kona's motion to dismiss Wagner's claim for punitive damages under the Jones Act.A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.
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