Scheuring v. Traylor Brothers, Inc.
Kevin Scheuring began working as a crane operator for Traylor Brothers, Inc. (TB), in August of 2002 aboard the William F; a 130-foot long, 798-ton, steel-hulled derrick barge used in construction projects which was owned and operated by TB. The barge did not navigate on its own power but could reposition and maneuver itself by means of winches and was subject to tides, swells, waves, and wakes. Scheuring was hired by TB for the duration of a construction project in the Long Branch Cruise Terminal. His job required him to operate the crane to loft pile, hold leads, start the hammer that drives the pile. Occasionally he helped move the William F, handled lines, weighed and dropped anchors, stood look out, spliced wire and rope, and monitored the radio.
In order to board the William F, the employees had to walk down a ramp to an offshore float where a skiff would take them out to the barge. On September 11, 2002 Scheuring and several other employees attempted to lift the 180-pound ramp, which would often fall into the water because it could not be affixed to the float, out of the water. In doing so, Scheuring slipped and injured his back.
Scheuring filed suit against Traylor brothers alleging that TB knew of this problem for two months and that he was entitled to recover under the Jones Act 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 or, in the alternative, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In response, TB filed a motion for summary judgment against both of Scheurings claims which the district court granted. Scheuring appealed the district court's decision to grant both motions for summary judgment.Does a crane operator on a barge qualify as a Jones Act Seaman? Does an employer, as the owner of the barge, owe a duty to his employees for a ramp that provides access not to the barge, but to the float that allows the employees to board the barge?
The court began its analysis by explaining the current test for whether an employee qualifies as a Jones Act seaman. The current analysis is a mixed question of law and fact and summary judgment is improper if reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether the employee was a member of the crew. The Supreme Court created a two-part test to determine whether a person qualifies as a seaman: 1) the employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of the mission, and 2) the employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation, or group of vessels, that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). TB contests only whether Scheuring's duties are of the appropriate nature to satisfy the second prong of the second element of the Chandris test.
In answering this question, the district court looked for further guidance from the Chandris decision which explained that the nature inquiry concentrates on whether the employee's duties take him to sea; thereby creating a distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers. Next, the district court looked to Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting this inquiry. In Cabral v. Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc., 128 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit denied a crane operator working aboard a construction barge seaman status for two reasons: first, the plaintiff failed to show evidence that he would continue to work aboard the barge after completion of the project he was hired for; and second, there was no evidence that the barge ever moved during the plaintiff's time aboard the barge. In contrast, in Delange v. Dutra Construction Co., 183 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1999), the plaintiff was hired as a carpenter on a piledriving crew engaged in the construction of a navigation aid. Here, the Ninth Circuit found an issue of fact because the plaintiff provided evidence that his job included serving as a lookout, cargo stower, line holder, and occasionally piloting the barge when it was being moved.
The appellate court found the present case distinguishable from the Cabral case because like the plaintiff in Delange Scheuring alleged that the barge moved several times while he was aboard and that during these times he performed sea-based duties such as handling lines, weighing and dropping anchors, standing look-out, splicing rope, and operating the marine radio. As such, the Ninth Circuit found the existence of a factual dispute to be decided by a jury and reversed the lower court's decision. It's important to note, however, that the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he qualified as a seaman simply because the vessel was subjected to surges, tides, and swells. The court rejected this argument because this approach would render the second requirement that a seaman have a substantial connection to the vessel in duration and nature meaningless.
The Ninth Circuit next addressed Scheuring's LHWCA claim. The LHWCA replaces an employee's rights to tort recovery from his employer with statutory payments. This limitation extends only to an employee's employer not a vessel owner. Here, the defendant is both the employer and vessel owner. In these dual-capacity suits, an employee may recover for negligence against the vessel owner if the negligent act was a result of the defendant's duties as a vessel owner and not an employer. Thus, the question becomes whether TB's alleged negligence came as a result of his duties as a vessel-owner or employer?
A vessel owner owes three duties to a longshore worker: 1) the turnover duty, 2) to exercise reasonable care in areas that remain under control of the vessel, and 3) the duty to intervene. Here, the court was concerned with the turnover duty which requires the vessel owner to turn the vessel over to the longshoreman in a safe condition and to warn the worker of any dangerous conditions. To fulfill the first part of this duty a vessel must turn the ship over to the worker in a condition that an experienced stevedore worker, mindful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to encounter, will be able to carry on his duties with reasonable safety. Therefore, the first issue for the court to answer is whether the ramp is a part of the William F.'s equipment and appliances. Scheuringer argues the ramp is similar to a gangway; while, TB argues that the ramp is better analogized to a dock or pier. The Ninth Circuit that this determination created a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to decide. This did not, however, conclude the court's analysis. It still had to determine whether TB discharged its turnover duty by providing the ramp-float-skiff means of access to the vessel. The turnover duty requires only that the vessel owner exercise ordinary care thereby allowing the experienced stevedore to work in an inherently dangerous occupation safely. As such, the question becomes a question for the trier of fact as to whether TB acted reasonably. Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's granting of summary judgment to Scheuring's LHWCA claim.The Supreme Court created a two-part test to determine whether a person qualifies as a seaman: 1) the employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of the mission, and 2) the employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation, or group of vessels, that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature.
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