In re Endeavor Marine Inc.
Kevin Baye worked as a crane operator for his employer Crane Operators; which provides crane operators on an as-need basis to businesses that own or operate cranes. On April 4, 1996, Baye was working aboard the derrick barge FRANK L and was injured while attempting to moor the barge to a cargo vessel. Baye suffered disabling knee and back injuries from a mooring line that struck him. Baye received benefits under the Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and now seeks recovey under the Jones Act. Baye filed suit against his employer, the barge owner, and the tug boat owner. Both vessel owners filed for limitation of liability in Federal Court. In addition to their action seeking limitation, the two vessel owners filed cross-claims against Crane Operators for contribution and indemnification. In response, Crane Operators filed a motion for summary judgment in the limitation action arguing that there is no Jones Act liability because Baye fails to satisfy the requirements of a seaman. The district court granted Crane Operators motion because it found that Baye's work did not bring him to sea. The owners of the two vessels filed appeals arguing that Baye's seaman status is immaterial to their right to limitation.
Does the plaintiff qualify as a seaman?
In Chandris Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995), the Supreme Court outlined a three part test to determine whether an individual qualifies as a seaman. Under Chandris, a claimant must show (1) that his duties contribute to the function of the vessel or its mission, (2) that his connection to the vessel is substantial in duration and nature, and (3) that the vessel is in navigation. No party contests the issue of whether Baye satisfies the first or third requirement. Further, the parties do not contest whether Baye's connection to the vessel was substantial in duration since the record shows that he spent almost all of this time working aboard a vessel prior to the accident. Thus, the court examined the remaining issue of whether Baye's duties aboard the Frank L satisfy the nature requirement set out in Chandris.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the narrow approach the lower court took when it denied Baye seaman status because his work did not take him to sea but to a moored barge. The Fifth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court's language of "going to sea" was not limited to the actual process of going to sea but whether the individual's employment connection to the vessel regularly exposed him to the perils of the sea.
After rejecting the lower court's interpretation of the law, the Fifth Circuit reexamined the record to determine whether Baye's connection to the vessel was substantial in nature. The record showed that Baye was permanently assigned to the FRANK L and spent roughly eighteen months working aboard the vessel. Further, Baye's primary responsibility was to operate a crane that loaded and unloaded cargo vessels. Most importantly, Baye worked aboard a vessel that was constantly exposed to the perils of the seal and as such so was he. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Baye satisfies all of the requirements of a Jones Act seaman.The duration of the worker's connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities taken together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.
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