Gizoni v. Southwest Marine Inc.
Byron Gizoni worked for Southwest Marine Inc. ("Southwest") as a shore-based rigger and rigging-foreman. While working on a pontoon barge owned by his employer, Gizoni stepped into a hole in the deck of the vessel, slipped, and suffered injuries. At the time of his injury, the pontoon barge was secured to the end of a floating dry-dock in Southwest's shipyard and was being used to repair a rudder on a U.S. Navy ship. Gizone sued Southwest under the Jones Act alleging that his work aboard the various vessels in Southwest's fleet qualified him as a seaman. Southwest filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Gizoni was a harbor worker not a seaman and therefore was precluded from suing under the Jones Act. The Ninth Circuit reversed that decision and remanded the issue for trial by jury. At trial, the jury held that Gizoni was not a seaman. Gizona now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of seaman because it declined to instruct the jury on the fleet seaman doctrine.
Did the trial court err in not providing a jury instruction on the fleet seaman doctrine? Did the trial court err in its other instructions to the jury pertaining to the seaman status test?
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by providing all the relevant applicable law. It explained that in order to qualify as a seaman, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the vessel on which he was employed was in navigation, (2) that he had a more or less permanent connection with the vessel, and (3) that his job contributed to the function or mission of the vessel. Next, the court explained that the fleet seaman doctrine was developed by the Fifth Circuit to allow individuals exposed to the perils of sea but fail to be assigned permanently to a vessel. Under this doctrine, an individual is granted seaman status if he can show permanent assignment to a group of vessels under common ownership or control.
The lower court refused to provide a jury instruction on the fleet doctrine because it found that whether he was attached to one or multiple vessels was not at issue. During trial, however, Gizoni provided evidence that he worked aboard numerous vessels owned by Southwest; and, during closing arguments, Southwest's attorney argued that Gizoni failed to prove that he was permanently attached to the particular barge upon which he suffered his alleged injury. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the lower court did err in not instructing the jury on the fleet seaman doctrine because Gizoni provided an evidentiary basis for the instruction and Southwest addressed the issue of attachment in its closing arguments.
Next the court addressed Gizoni's appeal of the district court's jury instructions pertaining to the location of the injury, the vessel instruction, and the permanent connection. Gizoni argues that the trial court's instruction that he must prove that the platform on which he was working at the time of the accident was a vessel in navigation misled the jury into thinking that he must have been injured on a vessel to be a seaman. The Ninth Circuit was not convinced that the instruction led to the interpretation that GIzoni put on the instruction. In regards to the vessel instruction, Gizoni argues that the jury instruction overstated the importance of the transportation purposes of a vessel. Here, the Ninth Circuit held that the instruction was improper because the district court stated: "if the transportation function, if any, of the floating platform was merely incidental to its other functions, the floating platform cannot be found to be a vessel." The Ninth Circuit found this instruction to be an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court addressed the permanent connection instruction. The lower court instructed the jury that Gizoni must prove a more or less permanent connection with the vessel which was substantial in terms of time and work, rather than sporadic, temporary, or incidental. Gizoni argues that this instruction misled the jury into thinking that he was required to spend most of his time on the barge. Like the first instruction, the Ninth Circuit failed to see how this instruction was in any way misleading from the purpose of the connection element of the seaman test.A party is entitled to instruction regarding his or her theory of case if it is supported by law and has some foundation in evidence.
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