Delange v. Dutra Construction, Inc.
Brian Delange worked as a carpenter for Dutra Construction Inc. (Dutra). His duties included mechanical work, welding, carpentry, supply runs, and occasionally pile driving. At no point in his work with Dutra was he permanently or regularly assigned to a vessel owned by Dutra. He would, however, occasional perform work deckhand work and only once he piloted a tug. On the day of his injury, Delange was working as a piledriver engaged in the construction of a navigation aid. He was transported to the worksite on a barge that was being pushed by a tugboat. During transit, Delange was charged with the duty of keeping the barge's equipment secure. Delange's fingers were crushed while he was assisting in the lowering of the anchor. He filed suit against Dutra under both the Jones Act and the Longshore Harbor and Worker's Compensation Act. In response, Dutra filed and won motions for summary judgment on both claims Delange asserted. Delange appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that he did not raise a triable issue of fact pertaining to his status as a seaman and that the record showed specific facts that his LHWCA negligence claim was triable.
Did the trial court err in granting the defendant's motions for summary judgment?
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by outlining the seaman status test created in Chandris. Under Chandris, an individual qualifies as a seaman if (1) his duties contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of her mission, and (2) he has a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial both in duration and in nature. The lower court held that Delange failed to satisfy either of these requirements. It ruled that Delange's tasks in constructing a navigation aid did not contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of her mission. The appellate court took issue with the district court's failure to recognize that the construction of the navigation aide was as much the vessels mission as it was Delange's mission.
Having found the first issue satisfied it turned its focus to the two prongs in the second requirement. Again, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding that Delange was a land-based worker and not a member of the crew. The Ninth Circuit explained that an individual satisfies the second element of the Chandris seaman test if his duties are inherently vessel-related and take him to sea. The court explained that workers hired for a short period fail to satisfy this element of the test. So do crane operators that work aboard the vessel when it remains stationary throughout the completion of the individual's duties.
Here, however, Delange worked aboard the vessel during a period of five months and would serve as lookout while the vessel was underway, handle lines, stow cargo, and even piloted a barge. Further, Delange alleges that over eighty percent of his time aboard the vessels involved crewman and deckhand duties. These facts and the fact that the court is required to construe all facts in favor of the non-moving party compelled the appellate court to remand the issue of Delange's seaman status to trial.
Finally the Ninth Circuit addressed the dismissal of Delange's LHWCA claim. A longshoreman is entitled to recover compensation and benefits from their employers according to statutory guidelines. Additionally, he may sue the operator of the vessel upon which he was injured for negligence. Under the LHWCA, a vessel operator owes a turnover duty to longshoreman. This duty requires the vessel operator to perform two tasks: (1) exercise ordinary care in turning over its vessel so that an experienced longshoreman reasonably conducting his operations will not be injured and (2) warn the longshoreman of any hazards on the ship that are known to the vessel operator. Delange contends that the defective pin that led to his fingers being crushed could have been identified in time to avoid the accident. Dutra, however, provided evidence of an inspection of the vessels that morning that found no problems with the barge. As a result, Delange was required to provide specific facts showing that his negligence claim was triable. The evidence in the record fails to do so.
Thus, the court reversed and remanded Delange's Jones Act claim and affirmed the lower court's ruling on Delange's LHWCA claim.A maritime worker's connection to a vessel in navigation is substantial if his duties are inherently vessel-related and thus "take him to sea."
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