Collier v. Ingram Barge Co.
David Collier alleges that he qualifies as a seaman under the employment of Ingram Barge Company. Collier began working as a tankerman for Ingram on July 26, 2006 and would work 12 hour shift work, 10 days on and 10 days off while sleeping at his home on shore every night. His responsibilities included servicing Ingram's line boats by providing them with fuel , lubricants, water, removing trash and slop oil. He provided these services from Ingram's fuel flats. The process involved a vessel tying off to the flat and then Collier would hand the appropriate lines to the line boat's engineer to attach to the appropriate valves. After completion of the task the lines would be passed back. Collier filed suit after allegedly suffering an injury on January 18, 2007 and filed suit on March 6, 2008. Now, Ingram seeks a summary judgment on the grounds that Collier cannot recover under the Jones Act or the general maritime law for unseaworthiness because he does not qualify as a seaman and the Longshoreman and Harbor's Worker Act does not recognize employer negligence.
Does the plaintiff qualify as a seaman? Can an employer be sued for negligence under the LHWCA?
The district court began its analysis as to whether Collier qualified as a seaman by outlining the Chandris test. In Chandris, the Supreme Court held that the two essential requirements for seaman status are (1) that an employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission and (2) that the employee must have a connection to a vessel or vessels in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. The purpose of this test is to ensure that only individuals regularly exposed to the perils of the sea receive the benefits of the Jones Act. Ingram cited several cases that denied individuals seaman status because the perils they faced were limited to those faced by longshoreman on a regular basis, such as, trip-and-fall, falling overboard, walking from barge to barge, and never actually going to sea but remaining tied to the a pier. Further, Ingram pointed to case law denying an individual seaman status because he ate meals ashore, went home every night, and failed to go to sea.
Specifically, Ingram argues that Collier is not the intended beneficiary because he was never exposed to the perils of the sea on a regular basis due to the fact that he was tied to shore and in the event of hazardous conditions could easily retreat inland. Collier argues in opposition, that he was treated in the same as every other crewmember and was told that he was a crewmember and although he did not sleep on the flats he did eat his meals aboard the flats. Further, he argues that he was regularly exposed to the perils of the sea such as snapping lines, drowning, falling overboard, being crushed between the fuel flat and the line boat and despite weather conditions he was always subject to the wind, waves, and tides. Due to the court's duty to view facts in favor of the non-moving party and the clear issues of material fact as to the extent of Collier's exposure to the perils of the sea and his duties the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment pertaining to Collier's Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.
Next, the court considered Ingram's motion for summary judgment in regards to Collier's 905(b) LHWCA claim. Under the LHWCA, an injured longshoreman may not sue his employer for negligence because the Act replaced the employer's liability with a statutory payment scheme. A vessel owner, however, does not share the employer's immunity from tort suit. Often, a vessel owner will employ its own stevedoring services and when it does courts treat the vessel owner also as an employer but it remains liable for its negligence as a vessel owner. Ingram argues that summary judgment is proper because Collier failed to allege any negligence on behalf of Ingram as a vessel owner and that the allegation that he was negligent as an employer is preempted by the statutory scheme in the LHWCA. In contrast, Collier argues that Ingram breached its turn over duty as a vessel owner, despite pleading his claim in negligence against his employer. This duty consists of two obligations. The first requires the ship owner to turn the vessel over in a safe condition. The second requires the vessel owner to warn the longshoreman of any hazards on the ship or its equipment that are known or should be known to the owner. Here, the court found that the plaintiff proved that genuine issues of material fact existed to whether Ingram fulfilled its turnover duty by failing to inform Collier of the lock line that he tripped over.A company that acts in a dual capacity as a vessel owner and employer may be sued under the Longshoreman and Harbor Worker's Act for his negligence as a vessel owner.
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