Randy Klump v. Oglebay Norton Marine Services Company
Before this Court was defendant’s motion in limine to prevent Randy Klump, plaintiff, from arguing that “this lawsuit in general, or the Jones Act in particular, is his “only remedy” or that this lawsuit represents Klump’s only chance to have his day in court”.
This underlying action involved a Jones Act claim by Klump against his employer, Oglebay. Klump was injured due to a slip and fall while attempting to restart his bicycle. Klump was a cook aboard the vessel owned by Oglebay and was returning to the vessel when the fall occurred.
The only remaining issue is whether Oglebay, as his employer, is liable for his injuries under the Jones Act.
Oglebay filed this motion to preclude Klump from stating that the Jones Act is his only remedy and only chance for his day in court.
Did this Court grant defendant’s motion in limine precluding the plaintiff from asserting that the Jones Act was his “only remedy”?
Oglebay argued that Klump should be precluded from presenting evidence suggesting that this lawsuit is his “only remedy” because it is irrelevant and will unduly prejudice Oglebay.
Oglebay relied upon Munns v. CSX, 2009 WL 805133, where the court excluded any argument by the plaintiff that the action was plaintiff’s “only remedy”. The plaintiff in Munns had received disability payments from the Railroad Retirement Board and the suggestion that the lawsuit was his only remedy was false in light of his disability benefits.
Klump, on the other hand, contended that he should be able to inform the trier of fact that he is allowed only one opportunity in court to present his claim. Klump contended that while he should be able to inform the jury that this is his “one day in court” he did not directly question Oglebay’s assertion that he should not be able to argue this case is his only avenue to recovery.
Klump acknowledged that he cannot argue to the jury that his ineligibility for workers compensation benefits entitles him to relief under the Jones Act.
This Court found merit in both arguments. As to Oglebay’s assertion, this Courtr found that Klump should not be allowed to argue that this case is his only avenue of recovery because he is entitled to receive maintenance and cure benefits and that Klump has another suit pending in this Court against the dock owner.
On the other hand, this Court recognized that there is no reason to completely prohibit the use of the phrase “one day in court” throughout the duration of the trial. When the trial starts, it will be Klump’s “one day in court” as it relates to Oglebay, and Klump should be free to remind the jury of this fact so long as Klump does not cross the line and suggest that “his one day in court” is his only avenue of recovery.
Both parties acknowledged that the collateral source rule bars parties, generally, from introducing evidence that a plaintiff in a FELA case has already received disability insurance benefits because of concerns the jury will offset the FELA award by the amount already received from the insurance company.
Accordingly, Klump cannot argue that this case is his only avenue to recovery. However, Oglebay has not demonstrated that a broad order prohibiting the use of the phrases “one day in court” and “workers compensation” is necessary.
This Court denied Oglebay’s motion in limine.
Mentioned in this case is the “collateral source rule”. Generally, the collateral source rule prohibits evidence relating to collateral sources (such as workers’ compensation – disability benefits – etc) because such evidence is readily subject to misuses by a jury.
The defendants in a case, if allowed to bring in collateral sources of recovery, might argue that because plaintiff has received another form of benefits, than the plaintiff, in the action, should not be able to recover from the defendant under another theory of recovery.
Steve Gordon
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